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COMMENTS 
Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in 
Informal Rulemaking: What Constitutes "Good 
Cause" Under the Administrative Procedure Act? 
Through their ability to promulgate rules that have the 
force of law, federal agencies have substantial power to affect 
the personal and property rights of United States citizens. In 
recognition of the influence wielded by such agencies, Congress 
in 1946 enacted the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)l "to 
afford parties affected by administrative powers a means of 
knowing what their rights are and how they may be protected.'" 
Under the Act an agency engaging in informal rulemakings is 
required to follow the procedure established in 5 U.S.C. 5 553: 
which calls for notice to the parties affected and an opportunity 
for those interested to comment upon the proposed rules. Sec- 
tion 553 provides that notice and opportunity to comment need 
not be provided "when the agency for good cause finds . . . that 
notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unneces- 
sary, or contrary to the public interest? 
This Comment addresses the nature and scope of the "good 
cause exception" to the general requirement of prior notice and 
comment in informal rulemaking? A discussion of federal court 
1. Ch. 324, 1-12,60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current version codified in scattered sections 
of 5 U.S.C.). 
2. S. REP. NO. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1945) (hereinafter cited as S. REP. NO. 
752); see also H.R. REP. NO. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1946) (hereinafter cited as 
H.R. REP. NO. 1980). 
3. " '[Rlule making' means agency process for the formulating, amending, or repeal- 
ing a rule." 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (1976). " '[R]ule7 means the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency and includes the approval or prescription for the future of 
rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganization thereof, prices, facilities, 
appliances, services or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or prac- 
tices bearing on any of the foregoing." Id. 3 551(4). 
4. 5 U.S.C. 553 (1976). 
5. Id. 5 553(b)(B). 
6. The informal - or notice and comment - rulemaking procedure requires publi- 
cation of notice in the Federal Register and opportunity for those interested to submit 
oral or written comments. 5 U.S.C. 8 553 (1976). The APA also establishes a formal 
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interpretation and application of the exception develops its con- 
tours and serves as a foundation for a proposed rule to govern 
its application. 
The minimum procedure an agency must follow in promul- 
gating a rule is governed by 5 U.S.C. $ 553.' This section re- 
quires that the agency publish a proposed rule in the Federal 
Register and invite comment from interested parties, either with 
or without an opportunity for oral presentation. The agency is 
then required to consider the data thus gathered in its formula- 
tion of the final rule. The final rule is to be published at least 
thirty days before it is to take effect, providing an opportunity 
for protests to be directed at  the final version before its impact 
is felt. 
This procedure serves two functions: allowing public partici- 
pation in rulemaking and promoting agency education? Provid- 
ing interested members of the public an opportunity to partici- 
pate is crucial to the maintenance of a representative form of 
government, since rulemaking is a delegation of legislative power 
to a nonrepresentative body.@ And while hearing the public, the 
agency draws upon the public's knowledge - particularly upon 
the expertise of individuals with special training and skills in the 
area to be regulated, and upon the experience of those to be af- 
fected by the rule. When scrupulously followed, the rulemaking 
procedure effectuates the intended purposes of the APA, which 
are (1) to adequately protect the private interests involved, (2) 
to make only reasonable and authorized regulations, (3) to im- 
partially confer authorized benefits or privileges, and (4) to fully 
rulemaking procedure "[wlhen rules are required by statute to be made on the record 
after opportunity for an agency hearing." Id. § 553(c). The formal rulemaking procedure 
requires "trial type" hearings, including the right to submit evidence and to cross-ex- 
amine. See id. 556-557; B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 172-73 (1976). 
7. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, a t  16. Section 553 applies only when no adjudi- 
cation has been required by statute. If a statute requires adjudication-"to be deter- 
mined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing9'-§ 554 governs the pro- 
ceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976). 
8. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 730,744 (3d Cir. 1979); Pacific 
Coast European Conf. v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 
U.S. 958 (1965). See also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 777-79 (1969) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
9. Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740,744 (3d Cir. 1979); Hotch v. 
United States, 212 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1954). 
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effectuate the declared policies of Congress.lo 
From the overall requirements of prior notice and opportu- 
nity for comment in the rulemaking procedure, Congress carved 
out specific exceptions where observance of the procedure would 
not be feasible, practical, or necessary. Among these is the good 
cause exception, upon which this Comment will focus.ll The 
good cause exception found in section 553(b)(B) excludes a rule 
from the notice and comment requirement "when the agency for 
good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief state- 
ment of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or con- 
trary to the public interest."la This exception is designed to give 
agencies flexibility in the promulgation of substantive rules by 
allowing them discretion to dispense with notice and comment 
for rules dealing with matters not otherwise exempted from the 
rulemaking procedure. However, the use of any of the exceptions 
to the notice and comment requirement is to be strictly lim- 
ited.'" As stated in the House Judiciary Committee Report on 
the APA: "The principal purpose of [section 5531 is . . . to pro- 
vide that the legislative functions of administrative agencies 
shall so far as possible be exercised only upon public participa- 
tion . . . . ,914 
The terms "impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the 
public interest," limiting the circumstances in which the good 
cause exception is to be employed,16 are defined in the Senate 
Judiciary Committee Report on the APA as follows: 
"Impracticable" means a situation in which the due and re- 
quired execution of the agency functions would be unavoidably 
10. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, a t  18. 
11. Other exceptions to the notice and comment requirement are for rulemaking 
involving "a military or foreign affairs function of the United States," 5 U.S.C. 3 
553(a)(1) (1976), for rulemaking involving "a matter relating to agency management or 
personnel or to public property, loans, grant., benefits or contracts," id. 3 553(a)(2), and 
for rulemaking involving "interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of 
agency organization, procedure or practice," id. 3 553(b)(A). 
12. Id. 553(b)(B). 
13. See, e.g., Housing Auth. of Omaha v. United States Housing Auth., 468 F.2d 1 ,9  
(8th Cir. 1954); Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280, 282 (9th Cir. 1954). 
14. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, a t  23. 
15. 5 U.S.C. 8 553(b)(3)(B) (1976). 
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prevented by its undertaking public rule-making proceedings. 
"Unnecessary" means unnecessary so far as the public is con- 
cerned, as would be the case if a minor or merely technical 
amendment in which the public is not particularly interested 
were involved. "Public interest" supplements the terms "im- 
practicable" or "unnecessary"; it requires that public rule- 
making procedures shall not prevent an agency from operating 
and that, on the other hand, lack of public interest in rule- 
making warrants an agency to dispense with public 
procedure. l6 
As is apparent from these definitions, the parameter of the good 
cause exception is rather narrowly confined. The Senate Judici- 
ary Committee Report makes clear that it is not an "escape 
clause"; reliance on the provision must be conditioned upon a 
"true and supported or supportable finding of necessity or emer- 
gency . . . made and published."17 Representative Walter, com- 
menting on the proposed Administrative Procedure Act before 
the House of Representatives, stated that the good cause excep- 
tion "may be made operative only where facts and interests are 
such that notice and proceedings are impossible or manifestly 
unnecessary. "I8 
Congress realized that strict adherence to the requirement 
of notice and comment would not always be possible, that under 
certain conditions notice and opportunity for comment would 
clog the functioning of an agency to the point of destroying its 
effectiveness to deal with the problems delegated to it by Con- 
gress. However, Congress also realized that such circumstances 
should arise infrequently, and it expected that the agencies 
would use sound discretion in determining when circumstances 
warranted the use of the good cause exception.lB 
A good cause exception also exists to the section 553(d) re- 
quirement that a final rule be published thirty days before its 
16. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, 
a t  24. 
17. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, a t  14. The original Senate version of 5 553 
phrased the good cause exception as "any situation in which the agency for good cause 
finds notice and public procedure thereon impracticable because of unavoidable lack of 
time or other emergency." S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(3) (1945), reprinted in 
NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY MANUAL FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 38 
(1947). The Senate Report was drafted after the change to the current language. 
18. 92 CONG. REC. 5650 (1946). 
19. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 7 % ~  CONG.,  ST SESS., REPORT ON ADMIN- 
ISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (Comm. Print 1945), reprinted in S. Doc. No. 248,79th Cong., 
2d Sess. 11, 19 (1946). 
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effective date.20 The congressional reports make clear that this 
provision in no way relates to the notice and comment require- 
ment," but the federal courts have not always been careful to 
maintain the distinction." A circuit court, interpreting the sec- 
tion 553(d) good cause exception to require a lesser degree of 
good cause than the section 553(b)(B) exception, recently used 
the section 553(d) exception to support its approval of comment 
after promulgation of a rule as a substitute for prepromulgation 
notice and comment.2s 
A. Development of the Contours of the 'Good Cause" 
Exception by the Federal Courts 
Cases where the courts have approved agency use of the 
good cause exception fall into three general categories: (1) where 
public notification in advance of the rule promulgation would 
exacerbate the problem sought to be alleviated by the rule; (2) 
where the delay in promulgation of the rule would or could have 
a direct detrimental effect on public health, safety, or welfare; 
and, (3) where the court deems the need for notice and comment 
under the rulemaking procedure unnecessary. The first two cate- 
gories are based generally on. the  "impracticable" aspect of the 
exception; the third category is, of course, based on the "unnec- 
essary" aspect. 
1.  Exacerbation of Problem 
The first category of cases in which the courts have upheld 
the agency use of the good cause exception to notice and com- 
ment-where the objective sought by the regulation would be 
frustrated by prior public notification-presents the strongest 
case for the approval of the exceptions. A typical case in this 
category results from an agency fixing or removing a price ceil- 
ing.24 The good cause argued for dispensing with notice and 
20. 5 U.S.C. 8 553(d)(3) (1976). 
21. See S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 
25. 
22. See, e.g., Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1974), cert. 
denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); Kelly v. United States Dep't of Interior, 339 F. Supp. 1095 
(E.D. Cal. 1972). 
23. See United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 
100 S. Ct. 710 (1980). 
24. See, e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975); DeRieux 
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comment is that those to be affected by the regulation, on be- 
coming aware of the impending imposition or lifting of the ceil- 
ing, would withhold the commodity in anticipation of the re- 
moval of the ceiling, or would raise prices to have a higher base 
when the ceiling was imposed. In these cases prior public notice 
is clearly "impracticable" in the sense of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee definition; it would prevent the agency from fulfilling 
its function. 
In Nader v. S a ~ h i l l , ~ ~  the Cost of Living Council (CLC), 
without public notice or provision of opportunity to present 
views,a6 amended its Phase IV price regulation covering domes- 
tic crude petroleum to allow an immediate one dollar per barrel 
increase in the maximum ceiling price charged for "old oil."27 
The CLC justified dispensing with the procedural requirements 
of section 553 on the basis that the need "to provide immediate 
guidance and information with respect to the decisions of the 
Council" constituted good cause." The court found this state- 
ment of good cause insufficient, but held that good cause was 
present because advance announcement of the proposed price 
increase would have resulted in producers withholding "old oil" 
from the market until the price increase took effect, defeating 
the purpose of the regulation-alleviation of shortages caused by 
the Arab oil embargo.2e While this case seemed to present legiti- 
mate good cause, the court felt impressed to "stress categorically 
that our resolution of the procedural issues herein is founded 
upon the unique circumstances in which this price increase was 
v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 896 
(1974); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Federal Energy Admin., 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. 
Kan.), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Energy Reserves Group, Inc., v. Department of 
Energy, 589 F.2d 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App, 1978). 
25. 514 F.2d 1064 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
26. The procedural requirements of 5 U.S.C. 5 553 were made applicable to the CLC 
by 5 207 of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 5 207, 85 Stat. 
747 (1971) (uncodified) (amending Pub. L. No. 91-380, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (uncodified)). 
27. "Old oil" is oil produced at the May 15, 1973 level of production. See 38 Fed. 
Reg. 34,985 (1973). "New oil," oil that was in excess of the May 15, 1973 level of produc- 
tion, was unregulated and allowed to rise to the world price level in an effort to en- 
courage domestic production. Id. a t  34,986. 
28. Id. 
29. Though the CLC had not fully satisfied the requirements of 5 553(b)(3)(B)- 
because it  had failed to publish an adequate finding of good cause and supporting rea- 
sons therefor with the rules issued-the facts to support a finding of good cause was 
evident and compelling. The court therefore upheld the regulations. However, it warned 
that "repeated technical noncompliance [would] not be tolerated." 514 F.2d a t  1069. 
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formulated. Assuming less calamitous circumstances, we fully 
expect that any future decisions will take the utmost advantage 
of full and open public comment."3o 
The court apparently felt that under certain circumstances 
the removal of a price ceiling would not be sufficient good cause 
to dispense with public proceedings. This would be true of cases 
where the policy upon which the rule was based was not to en- 
sure the supply of a commodity, but to increase the profit out- 
look of a regulated service. For example, a railroad would not be 
expected to refuse to haul freight simply because it anticipated 
being able to charge more for the haulage in the future. Since 
the result sought would not be frustrated by public notice prior 
to promulgation of the rule, good cause would not exist to dis- 
pense with notice and comment. The purpose of the regulation 
is therefore important in a determination of whether or not 
there is good cause. 
In some cases the form of the regulation may be significant. 
For example, if a price ceiling fixed to control inflation is based 
on the transactions occurring during a 30-day period prior to the 
promulgation of the rule, good cause exists to dispense with no- 
tice and comment. Any notice of the impending regulation 
would fuel inflation by fostering price increases during the 30- 
day period by businesses desiring to push the price ceiling af- 
fecting them as high as possible.'l However, if the regulation 
were to establish a fixed price ceiling without regard to transac- 
tions occurring in the industry, the prior notice would not have 
any effect on the market contrary to that sought by regulation 
and therefore no good cause would exist?' 
30. Id. (emphasis in original). 
31. See DeRieux v. Five Smiths, Inc., 499 F.2d 1321 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. 
denied, 419 US. 896 (1974). While there was sufficient good cause in this case to allow 
the regulations to be published without providing for public notice and comment, the 
regulations had an interesting twist as applied to Five Smiths, Inc. As operator of the 
Atlanta Falcons, Five Smiths raised its season ticket prices and sold tickets for games to 
be played during 1971. Thereafter, Executive Order 11,615 fixed a 90-day price ceiling 
based on transactions occurring during the 30-day period prior to the promulgation of 
the regulation. Although the tickets were delivered before the freeze went into effect, the 
court looked at the playing of games rather than the sale of the tickets as the completion 
of the transaction. Rejecting challenges based on statutory interpretation and constitu- 
tional rights, the court held that the Falcons were bound during the 90-day freeze by the 
ticket prices charged for games played in 1970. 
32. In fact, the competition to sell goods at the best price possible before the ceiling 
is imposed, and the tendency to withhold purchase until then, could result in a market 
reduction to the proposed ceiling price prior to implementation of the regulation. See, 
e.g., Consumers Union, Inc. v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curium, 523 
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2. Public Health, Safety, or Welfare 
In the second category, courts have approved agency good 
cause based on the possibility that delay in promulgation could 
have detrimental consequences on public health, safety, or wel- 
fare. In Allegheny Airlines u. Village of Cedarhur~t ,~~ a munici- 
pal ordinance prohibiting flights below 1,000 feet was challenged 
on the ground that the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 had pre- 
empted the field. The village responded with the claim that the 
air traffic pattern directing planes landing at Idlewild Airport 
over the village was adopted without notice to all interested par- 
ties as required by 5 U.S.C. § 1003 (the predecessor of section 
553)34 and was consequently invalid. A prior regulation prescrib- 
ing a different traffic pattern, in effect from February 3, 1949 
until August 1950, had been adopted with compliance to the no- 
tice and comment procedures.8s Based on evidence that the ear- 
lier pattern was unsafe and on a statement in the rule that the 
traffic pattern was " 'adopted without delay in order to promote 
safety of the flying public' and that 'compliance with the notice 
procedures and effective date provision of [section 10031, would 
be impracticable and contrary to the public interest, and there- 
fore is not required,' "M the court with little discussion held that . 
the procedural requirements had been met. 
It is apparent that under appropriate circumstances public 
safety would constitute good cause to dispense with notice and 
comment, particularly where the safety interest sought to be 
protected by the regulation significantly outweighed the impact 
of the regulation on a small segment of the public. However, the 
Allegheny Airlines summary treatment of the issue is unsatisfy- 
ing; none of the evidence of the unsafe nature of the prior flight 
pattern is presented in the opinion.37 The fact that the prior 
F.2d 1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
33. 132 F. Supp. 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1955), aff'd, 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956). 
34. The rulemaking procedure enacted in the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 
5 4, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), was originally codified a t  5 U.S.C. $ 1003. In 1966, as part of a 
general revision and recodification of laws relating to government organizations and em- 
ployees, the rulemaking procedure was revised and recodified a t  5 U.S.C. $ 553. Act of 
Sept. 6, 1966 Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378 (1966). The relevant provisions of former 
5 1003 were substantially the same as current 5 553. 
35. 132 F. Supp. at 883-84. 
36. Id. at 884. 
37. On appeal the Second Circuit also gave cavalier treatment to the issue stating: 
"Additional contentions made by the appellants [including the notice and comment ar- 
gument] have not been overlooked but they do not in our opinion merit discussion." 
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flight pattern was allowed to be followed for eighteen months 
before the Civil Aeronautics Board felt compelled to promulgate 
a new patternS8 tends to diminish the likelihood that accommo- 
dation of the opportunity for public comment would have signif- 
icantly compromised the safety of the flying public. Based on 
the support offered in the Allegheny Airlines decision, it could 
not be fairly inferred that it was impracticable to allow for no- 
tice and comment in the sense that such an allowance would 
have impaired the functioning of the agency in providing for the 
public safety. It is this standard that Congress intended? 
Detroit Edison Co. u. EPA40 supports the view that there 
must be an element of exigency for notice and comment to be 
dispensed with on public health or safety grounds. There, a reg- 
ulation requiring sulfur dioxide emission sources to comply with 
limitations on sulfur in fuel and emission rates of sulfur dioxide 
was promulgated without prior notice and opportunity for com- 
ment. The health, safety, and welfare impact of continued fail- 
ure to meet the limitations on emission was significant, yet the 
court ruled that because of the substantial impact of the regula- 
tions and because of the EPA's failure to show that the regula- 
tions were based on emergency, the Administrator could not jus- 
tify lack of notice and comment as "impracticable, unnecessary, 
or contrary to the public interest.'"' Detroit Edison points out 
that in cases where the good cause asserted is potential damage 
to the health, safety, and welfare of the public, this potential 
damage must be balanced with the impact on the parties af- 
fected by the regulation in determining whether the good cause 
asserted is adequate to dispense with notice and ~omrnent?~ 
3. Lack of Necessity 
Court approval of agency assertions of good cause based on 
lack of necesssity for notice and comment constitutes the third 
category. Cases in this area indicate that a court may deem no- 
tice and comment unnecessary because some other mechanism 
Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812, 817 (1956). 
38. 132 F. Supp. at 883. 
39. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24. 
40. 496 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1974). 
41. Id. at 249. 
42. See generally Union of Concerned Scientists v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 499 
F.2d 1069, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (balancing of general welfare with impact in a constitu- 
tional due process context). 
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provides interested parties with an opportunity to present their 
views on the matter. In Appalachian Power Co. u. EPA?' it was 
argued that EPA approval and promulgation of state plans for 
implementation of federal ambient air quality standards were 
invalid because hearings were not held by the EPA prior to pub- 
lication of the plans.44 The court repelled this attack on the reg- 
ulations saying that the parties had been afforded opportunity 
to voice their objections to the plans in hearings held by the 
state.46 This, the court reasoned, coupled with a tight statutory 
deadline imposed by Congress-indicating its concern that the 
plans be promulgated as expeditiously as possible-rendered 
hearings at the EPA level both "unnecessary" and "impractica- 
ble." Therefore, the requirements of section 553(b)(B) to dis- 
pense with public proceedings for good cause had been met? 
Two facts diminish the precedential value of this case as 
support for the proposition that other types of proceedings may 
be good-cause substitutes for notice and comment. First, it is 
notable that the court did not base its holding solely on the 
prior opportunity to be heard in state hearings or on the statu- 
tory deadline. The court deemed the combination of the two to 
rise to the level of good cause, but expressed no view that either 
aspect alone was adequate. Second, the petitioners were seeking 
a hearing rather than just notice and opportunity to ~omrnent.'~ 
The court drew a distinction between hearings and other proce- 
dures, and its holding was limited to the decision that no hear- 
ing before the EPA was required. Consequently, a lesser showing 
of good cause was probably found adequate than would have 
been the case had the petitioners been seeking only notice and 
43. 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973). 
44. The court in dicta suggested that additional procedural requirements beyond 
those found in § 553 could be imposed if the question involved so demanded. Id. at 501. 
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 
435 U.S. 519 (1978), this dicta was overruled. There it was held that while an agency 
could in its discretion grant additional procedural rights, such rights could not be im- 
posed by the courts; § 553 establishes the maximum mandatory procedural require- 
ments. 
45. The record of the state hearings was not before the court, and accordingly it 
could not "determine whether those hearings provided the petitioners with the type of 
hearing the importance of their rights required." 477 F.2d at 503. .The case was thus 
remanded. On consideration after remand the court held that the state hearings had 
adequately satisfied the requirements of due process. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 
579 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1978). 
46. 477 F.2d at 503. 
47. See id. at 500-03. 
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opportunity for comment. 
In few cases would state hearings or other mechanisms for 
public input directed at parties other than the agency promul- 
gating the rule truly afford parties an opportunity to comment 
in the way contemplated by section 553. An agency engaged in 
rulemaking does so under the auspices of federal authority dele- 
gated by Congress, and its rules have the force of law.48 This fact 
is likely to provide an incentive to interested parties wishing to 
present views not present in other contexts. Also, a strong possi- 
bility exists that notice of such other public proceedings as may 
have been provided was not as extensive as the publication in 
the Federal Register required by section 553, which constitutes 
constructive notice to all citizens of the United States? 
A second type of case in this category is that in which com- 
ment subsequent to the promulgation of the rule is deemed by 
the court to satisfy the requirement of notice and opportunity 
for comment. In Pent-R-Books, Inc. v. United States Postal 
S e r ~ i c e , ~ ~  notice of a proposed rulemaking concerning use of the 
mails for sexually oriented advertising was published in the Fed- 
eral Register on January 12, 1971, calling for comment to be re- 
ceived by January 20, 1971. On January 30, 1971, revised regula- 
tions were published and were made effective on publication 
with the stipulation that comment would be considered after the 
effective date. After receipt and consideration of additional com- 
ment, amended regulations were published on May 5, 1971. The 
court stated that whatever objection there was to the original 
regulations as published on January 30 was disposed of by the 
repromulgati~n.~~ While this case raises the issue of whether in- 
terested parties had "the reality of an opportunity to submit an 
effective presentati~n,"~~ it is not clearly a good cause exception 
case; prior notice and opportunity to comment were provided, 
though on a reduced scale. The case does, however, point to the 
idea that allowance of comment after publication may be ade- 
quate to correct deficiencies in compliance with the notice and 
comment requirement. 
It seems unlikely that postpromulgation opportunity to 
48. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 126-27 (3d ed. 1972). 
49. 44 U.S.C. $ 1508 (1976). 
50. 328 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
51. Id. at 312. 
52. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 503 (4th Cir. 1973) (quoting Wal- 
ter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1971)). 
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comment would ever be found to substitute for prepromulgation 
notice and comment in the absence of some other showing of 
good cause. But a court may be willing to accept a lesser stan- 
dard of good cause than that prescribed by section 553 where 
postpromulgation comment has been accepted.53 However, this 
approach has been rejected in several decisions." One court suc- 
cinctly stated: "The reception of comments after all the crucial 
decisions have been made is not the same as permitting active 
and well prepared criticism to become a part of the decision- 
making process."55 Postpromulgation comment is nowhere pro- 
vided for in section 553 as a substitute for prepromulgation no- 
tice and comment:6 and it should not relieve the agency from 
providing prepromulgation notice and comment, or from meet- 
ing the strict requirements of good cause contained in section 
553(b) (B) .57 
The courts generally have restricted the use of the "unnec- 
essary" aspect of the good cause exception to cases where the 
rule could truly be classified as "minor or merely technical, . . . 
in which the public is not particularly interested."" The con- 
gressional reports point out that the "unnecessary" aspect of the 
good cause exception can also be employed "where authority 
beneficial to the public does not become operative until a rule is 
issued."5s In these cases "the agency may promulgate the neces- 
53. See e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979) (dis- 
cussed in text accompanying notes 89-105 infra). 
54. American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977); Maryland v. 
EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975); City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kelly v. United States Dep't of Interior, 399 F. Supp. 1095 (E.D. Cal. 
1972). 
55. Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 222 (4th Cir. 1975). 
56. Wagner Electric Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1020 (3d Cir. 1972). However, if 
the standard of good cause contained in 5 553(b)(B) is met, Congress suggests that post- 
promulgation comment is desirable. See S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, a t  13-14; H.R. 
REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 23-24; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 
510 F.2d 692, 711 n.103 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
57. Agencies have attempted to avoid this consequence by calling the final regula- 
tion "interim final" and later promulgating the "final" rule. However, as the regulation 
would be effective when published in interim final form, proceeding in this manner is 
substantively no different than promulgation of a final rule with a later repromulgation, 
and so must be rejected on the same grounds. See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 
568 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1977); Consumers Union, Inc. v. Sawhill, 393 F. Supp. 639 (D.D.C.), 
aff'd per curiam, 523 F.2d 1404 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1975). 
58. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, a t  14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24. 
See, e.g., United States v. United States Trucking Corp., 317 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
59. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24. 
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sary rule immediately and rely upon supplemental procedures in 
the nature of a public reconsideration of the issued rule to sat- 
isfy the requirement of [section 553]."60 Thus, in the rare in- 
stances where a regulation has only beneficial effect on the pub- 
lic-such as a regulation implementing a tax relief measure-the 
agency is authorized to refine the regulation through post- 
promulgation comment proceedings. 
B. Recent Interpretations of the "Good Cause" Exception 
in Air Quality Non-Attainment Designation Cases 
A recent series of cases in the circuit courts depicts the con- 
tinuing confusion and uncertainty with which the federal courts 
approach the issue of what constitutes good cause to dispense 
with notice and opportunity for comment prior to promulgation 
of an agency rule. Under nearly identical factual and procedural 
settings, and in regard to the issuance of the same regulations, 
the Third and Fifth Circuits ruled that "good cause" did not 
exist for dispensing with prepromulgation notice and comment," 
while the Seventh Circuit ruled that there was indeed "good 
cause" and allowed the regulations to stand?' 
As originally enacted, the Clean Air Act (CL~A)~' required 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate na- 
tional primary and secondary ambient air quality standards 
(NAAQS)M and the states to develop implementation plans to 
achieve these  standard^.^^ In 1977, the CAA was amended to ex- 
tend the primary compliance deadline to 1982 and to prescribe a 
new implementation p r o c e ~ s . ~  Under the new process, the states 
were to submit to the Administrator of the EPA within 120 days 
60. Id. 
61. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979); United States Steel 
Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
62. United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 
S. Ct. 710 (1980). 
63. Ch. 360, 69 Stat. 322 (1955) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 55 7401-7626 
(Supp. I 1977)). 
64. 42 U.S.C. 3 7409(a) (Supp. I 1977). The national primary ambient air quality 
standards are those which, in the judgment of the Administrator of the EPA, are requi- 
site to protect the public health. Id. 5 7409(b)(l). The national secondary ambient air 
quality standards are those which, in the judgment of the Administrator of the EPA, are 
requisite to protect the public welfare. Id. 5 7409(b)(2). These standards, promulgated by 
the Administrator of the EPA pursuant to the statutory mandate, are codified a t  40 
C.F.R. $5 50.1-50.11 (1979). 
65. 42 U.S.C. 5 7410 (Supp. I 1977). 
66. Act of A u ~ .  7, 1977, Pub. L. NO. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977). 
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after August 1, 1977, a list of air quality regions or portions of 
regions that did not meet the NAAQS.67 The Administrator of 
the EPA was to promulgate these lists with any modifications he 
deemed necessary within sixty days after the states' submis- 
s i o n ~ . ~ ~  On March 3, 1978, without prior notice of a proposed 
rulemaking or opportunity for comment by interested parties, 
the EPA promulgated a list of attainment designations based on 
the states'  submission^.^^ 
One effect of the promulgation was to require the states to 
incorporate more stringent provisions into the state implementa- 
tion plan for areas that had been designated "non-attainment."'O 
Such revised implementation plans were to be submitted to the 
EPA no later than January 1, 1979." The more immediate im- 
pact of a nonattainment designation, however, resulted from a 
pre-existing EPA interpretive ruling-the "Offset R~ling."~' 
This ruling was explicitly adopted by Congress, had the force of 
law, and was enforceable by the EPA. The ruling severely lim- 
ited construction or modification of facilities that would contrib- 
ute to an existing violation of a N A ~ A Q S . ~ ~  
Steel companies operating plants in areas that had been 
designated "non-attainment" attacked the EPA promulgation of 
the attainment designation lists, contending, among other 
things, that the EPA violated the procedural requirements of 
the APA. The EPA had published a statement with the March 
3, 1978 promulgation asserting good cause based upon the tight 
statutory deadlines imposed by Congress, and upon the need to 
provide expeditious guidance to the states to enable them to for- 
mulate their implementation plans. It was contended that these 
grounds made it "impracticable and contrary to the public inter- 
est" to provide for prepromulgation notice and comment." 
67. 42 U.S.C. 3 7407(d)(l) (Supp. I 1977). 
68. Id. § 7407(d)(2). 
69. 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978). 
70. 42 U.S.C. $ 7502 (Supp. I 1977). 
71. Act of Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(c), 91 Stat. 750-51 (1977) 
(uncodified). 
72. 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976). 
73. See United States Steel v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1979); 42 U.S.C. 5 
7413(a)(5) (Supp. I 1977). 
74. See 43 Fed. Reg. 8,962 (1978). The full text of the statement is as follows: 
The States are now preparing revisions to their State implementation plans 
(SIPS) as required by sections 110(a)(2)(1) and 172 of the Act [42 U.S.C. $8 
7410(a)(2)(1), 75021. This enterprise, which must be completed by January 1, 
1979, requires that the States have immediate guidance as to the attainment 
931 GOOD CAUSE EXCEPTION 107 
The Third Circuit was the first to hand down an opinion. In 
Sharon Steel Corporation v. EPA,?5 the court reasoned that it 
should have been apparent to Congress at the time the amend- 
ments to the CAA were passed that tight statutory deadlines 
were being imposed, yet it did not express an intention that the 
amendments should relieve the EPA from the notice and com- 
ment requirement? The court went on to suggest that the stat- 
utory schedule did not preclude prior notice and comment. The 
state designations could have been published as a proposed rule, 
satisfying the APA requirement that the notice of rulemaking 
include "either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a 
description of the subjects and issues involved."77 The EPA then 
could have accepted comments and promulgated the final rule 
"on about April 15, 1978, instead of the March 3 date . . . 
achieved without notice and  comment^,"^^ which would still 
have allowed adequate time for the states to draft their plans. 
The court thus concluded that the statutory deadlines did not 
constitute good cause to dispense with notice and comment. 
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the states could 
have commenced development of the plans at the time they sub- 
mitted the designations to the EPA and then made modifica- 
tions as necessary if their designations were altered by the 
EPA? The court further held that the violation of the APA's 
notice and comment requirement was not cured by acceptance 
of comments after promulgation of the rule, since the decision of 
status of the areas designated under section 107(d). Congress has acknowl- 
edged this by imposing a tight schedule on the designation process and requir- 
ing EPA to promulgate the list within 180 days of the enactment of the 
amendments. Under these circumstances it would be impracticable and con- 
trary to the public interest to ignore the statutory schedule and postpone pub- 
lishing these regulations until notice and comment can be effectuated. For this 
good cause, the Administrator has made these designations immediately 
effective. 
Id. 
75. 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979). 
76. Id. at 380. 
77. 5 U.S.C. $ 553(b)(3) (1976). The Third Circuit had formerly noted that the final 
rule need not be identical to the proposed rule for notice to be effective: "[Tlhe ade- 
quacy of the notice must be tested by determining whether it would fairly apprise inter- 
ested persons of the 'subjects and issues' before the agency." American Iron and Steel 
Inst. v. EPA, 568 F.2d 284, 293 (3d Cir. 1977). 
78. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1979). Even without pro- 
viding notice and comment the EPA had missed the February 3, 1978 deadline. Id. a t  
380 n.7. 
79. Id. at 380. 
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Congress was to provide for prior notice and comment to allow 
"effective participation in the rulemaking process while the deci- 
sionmaker is still receptive to the information and arg~ment ."~~ 
The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue next, and in United 
States Steel Corporation u. EPAS1 concluded, as had the Third 
Circuit earlier, that the tight statutory schedule proposed by the 
EPA as good cause was insufficient to meet the requirements of 
section 553(b)(B), and that postpromulgation opportunity for 
comment was not an adequate substitute for prepromulgation 
notice and comment. The court thought that a tight statutory 
deadline was a factor to be considered in determining whether 
there is good cause, but that it could not be "good cause" by 
itself?' The court also recognized that there were "substantial 
public health interests involved," yet it did not find them ade- 
quate to satisfy the narrow exception to the notice and comment 
requirement contained in section 553(b)(B)? The court implic- 
itly analyzed the good cause exception in terms of the second 
category of the exception discussed above, where a delay in pro- 
mulgation could have detrimental consequences to the public 
health, safety, or welfare. While the impact on the public health 
was deemed significant, and while it was perceived that the con- 
gressional time framework indicated a concern with the public 
health, in the absence of express congressional indication that 
the rulemaking procedure of the APA was not to apply, the 
court was unable to find that the public health interest out- 
weighed the interest of the steel companies in having a voice in 
the rulemaking process. This was particularly true where the 
nonattainment designations, when coupled with the prior Offset 
Ruling, would strictly limit new construction or modification of 
plants in areas designated nonattainment." Characterizing the 
good cause exception as "an important safety valve to be used 
where delay would do real harm,"s6 the court found the harm to 
the steel companies caused by depriving them of prior notice 
and an opportunity to comment too substantial to be overcome 
by the potential harm to the public health and safety that would 
80. Id. at 381. 
81. 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979). 
82. Id. at 213. 
83. Id. at 214. 
84. 595 F.2d at 211. 
85. Id. 
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have attended the delay in promulgation of the  designation^.^^ 
The court went on to hold that acceptance of comments af- 
ter the promulgation of the rules did not cure the infirmity of 
the rules. I t  stated that to approve such a procedure "would 
make the provisions of § 553 virtually ~nenforceable,"~' since an 
agency wishing "to dispense with pre-promulgation notice and 
comment could simply do SO, invite post-promulgation comment, 
and republish the regulation before a reviewing court could 
In spite of the decisions of the Third and Fifth Circuits 
holding that "good cause" to dispense with notice and comment 
did not exist, the Seventh Circuit decided in United States 
Steel Corporation v. EPA8@ that the EPA did have good cause to 
dispense with notice and comment under section 553(b)(B). The 
court further reasoned that even if good cause did not exist to 
dispense with notice and comment under section 553(b)(B), 
comment could be postponed under a lesser standard of good 
cause found in section 553(d)(3) until after the promulgation of 
the final rule.@O 
The Seventh Circuit reasoned that the statutory deadlines 
imposed on the EPA to promulgate the attainment designations 
86. Id. at 214-15. 
87. Id. at 215. 
88. Id. 
89. 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 710 (1980). 
90. Ultimately the Seventh Circuit held that even if the procedural requirements of 
§ 553 had not been met, it could not reverse the EPA's action, since 42 U.S.C. § 
7607(d)(9)(D) limited reversal for failure to observe procedure to cases where 
(i) such failure to observe such procedure is arbitrary or capricious, (ii) the 
requirement of paragraph (7)(B) [requiring that the procedural objection be 
raised during the period of public comments] has been met, and (iii) the condi- 
tion of the last sentence of paragraph (8) [requiring that procedural error be 
"so serious and related to matters of such central relevance to the rule that 
there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have been significantly 
changed if such errors had not been made"] is met. 
42 U.S.C. $ 7607(d)(9)(D) (Supp. I 1977). Since the court found that none of these re- 
quirements had been met by the petitioning steel companies, it held that there could be 
no reversal for the procedural errors. 605 F.2d at 291. However, it should be noted that 
the Fifth Circuit had earlier dismissed United States Steel's argument that the more 
stringent procedural requirements of 7607(d) should be met by the EPA on remand, 
saying that the "designations are plainly not among the actions enumerated in 
§ 7607(d)," United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207, 215 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979), and 
that the provisions of $ 7607(d) therefore did not apply. In his vigorous dissent to the 
denial of certiorari to the Seventh Circuit case, Justice Rehnquist said that the Seventh 
Circuit's holding on this issue "[had] the effect of establishing two Administrative Proce- 
dure Acts, one for the EPA and one for all other agencies." United States Steel Corp. v. 
EPA, 100 US. Ct. 710, 711 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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and on the states to formulate implementation plans were ade- 
quate to satisify the "impracticable" aspect of the section 
553(b)(B) good cause exception. Reliance was placed on the sub- 
stitution of "impracticable, unnecessary or contrary to the pub- 
lic interest" for "impracticable because of unavoidable lack of 
time or other emergency," which had been found in earlier ver- 
sions of the bill that was later to become the APA?' The court 
deemed that this change in language had broadened the excep- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  This conclusion is undercut by the congressional reports 
on the bill drafted after the modification, which state that the 
exclusion was to be operative only upon a "true and supported 
or supportable finding of necessity or emergen~y."~~ Addition- 
ally, no circuit court had previously held that tight statutory 
deadlines alone were adequate to satisfy the good cause require- 
ment necessary to dispense with notice and comment. Arguably, 
the elimination of the "because of unavoidable lack of time" lan- 
guage narrowed, rather than broadened, the scope of the section 
553(b)(B) exception, since lack of time was eliminated as an exi- 
gency sufficient to dispense with notice and comment. 
The court also relied on two cases to support its assertion 
"that the 'good cause' exception may be utilized to comply with 
the rigors of a tight statutory sched~le."~~ In both cases the reli- 
ance is ill-founded. In the first, Clay Broadcasting Corp. v. 
United States,9s prior notice of the rulemaking had been pub- 
lished in the Federal Register and a large number of comments 
had been received? The challenge was to making the final rules 
effective immediately upon publication, rather than to the fail- 
ure to provide prior notice and comment. Therefore, this case 
was clearly governed by section 553(d) (3), not section 553(b) (B). 
The second case relied upon by the Seventh Circuit, Energy 
Reserves Group, Inc. v. Federal Energy Adminis t ra t i~n ,~  in- 
volved regulations governing the pricing of crude oil. These reg- 
ulations were required by statute to be promulgated within 15 
days of the enactment of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation 
91. S. 7, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 5 4(a) (1945). 
92. 605 F.2d at 287. 
93. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24. 
94. 605 F.2d at 287. 
95. 464 F.2d 1313 (5th Cir. 1972,) reu'd on other grounds sub nom. National Cable 
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974). 
96. Id. at 1316. 
97. 447 F. Supp. 1135 (D. Kan.), reu'd on other grounds sub nom. Energy Reserves 
Group, Inc. v. Department of Energy, 589 F.2d 1082 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978). 
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Act.08 The challenged regulations exempted "stripper" well pro- 
duction from price controls. Though the statutory deadline was 
significantly shorter than that facing the EPA in promulgation 
of the nonattainment designations, and though by its abridged 
duration alone the deadline implied a congressional intent to 
dispense with notice and comment, it played only a minor role 
in the court's determination that good cause existed to exclude 
the rulemaking from the notice and comment r eq~ i remen t .~~  
The court recognized that the purpose of the rule was to en- 
courage domestic production of crude oil in order to relieve the 
effects of the Arab oil boycott.loO Had prior notice of the im- 
pending release of price controls on stripper well oil production 
been published, such oil would have been held off the market in 
anticipation of the price increase, aggravating the already severe 
petroleum shortage. Energy Reserves Group, therefore, fits 
nicely into the first category of the "good cause" exception, 
where the goal of the regulation would be thwarted by prior 
public notice. 
The Seventh Circuit, apparently feeling uncomfortable with 
a decision based solely on the tight statutory deadline, men- 
tioned that continuing adverse impact on health would be 
caused by further delay, and in a footnote included tables of es- 
timates of adverse health effects if the NAAQS were not met in 
1980.lo1 While it is apparent that some adverse health impact is 
possible if the air pollution standards are not attained, it is not 
clear that provision of a notice and comment period would have 
significantly set back the attainment of such standards. As was 
pointed out by the Third Circuit, if a notice and comment pe- 
riod had originally been provided, the designation lists still 
could have been promulgated with adequate time for the states 
to develop implementation plans by January 1, 1979, the date 
required by statute.loa Moreover, the implementation plans were 
not the end result, but were to provide for the attainment of the 
air quality standards by December 31, 1982. And in certain cir- 
cumstances, and for certain pollutants, such attainment could be 
delayed until December 31, 1987.loS When filtered through this 
98. 447 F. Supp. at 1139. 
99. See id. at 1150. 
100. See id. at 1138. 
101. 605 F.2d at 288 & n.10. 
102. Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1979). 
103. 42 U.S.C. 5 7502(a)(b) (Supp. I 1977). 
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protracted chain of statutory requirements, it is doubtful that 
provision of a notice and comment period would have signifi- 
cantly delayed the ultimate attainment of the air pollution stan- 
dards. In such cases, where the potential for impact on public 
health is small and speculative in comparison to the real interest 
of parties to have an opportunity to comment, the strict provi- 
sions of the good cause exception have not been met. 
Even if the EPA's actions were not justified by the imprac- 
ticability standards of section 553, the Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that they were justified by the good cause exception found in 
section 553(d)(3). The court felt that section 553(d)(3) could be 
used to dispense with prior notice and comment, rather than no- 
tice and comment altogether, and that section 553(d)(3) allowed 
for a broader standard of good cause.lo4 While section 553(d)(3) 
arguably allows for a broader standard of good cause, and while 
it could have justified the EPA in publishing the rule effective 
immediately, it cannot be used to postpone notice and comment 
until after publication of a final rule. Section 553(d)(3) relates 
only to the conditions under which a final rule can be made ef- 
fective less than 30 days after its publication. I t  does not relate 
to when or under what conditions notice and comment need be 
provided. As stated in the Senate Judiciary Committee Report, 
" [section 553 (d)] does not provide procedures alternative to no- 
tice and other public proceedings required by the prior subsec- 
tions of this section [sections 553(a)-(c)]."lo6 As has been previ- 
ously noted, an agency wishing to dispense with prepro- 
mulgation notice and comment must meet the good cause re- 
quirement of section 553(b) (B) , even where postpromulgation 
opportunity for comment is provided. 
IV. TOWARD A CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE GOOD CAUSE 
EXCEPTION 
This Comment has pointed out a number of differences in 
the federal courts' interpretation of what constitutes good cause 
within the meaning of section 553(b)(B). Some courts have im- 
plied that other proceedings may substitute for the notice and 
comment procedure required by the APA, or that postpromulga- 
tion comment can correct the absence of prepromulgation notice 
104. 605 F.2d at 289-90. 
105. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 15; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, 
at 25. 
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and comment. Other courts have confused the standard to dis- 
pense with prior notice and comment with the standard to pub- 
lish a rule with immediate effect. Where public health and safety 
are involved, the courts have not articulated the bases of their 
decisions that provision of notice and comment would have had 
such an impact as to meet the congressional standard of "im- 
practicability9'-that is, impairment of "the due and required 
execution of the agency functions."106 As is demonstrated by the 
recent series of cases involving the EPA air quality nonattain- 
ment designations, courts applying different criteria can come to 
different conclusions on whether good cause is present, even 
where virtually identical factual and procedural settings are 
presented. 
While certain things seem clear-such as that other pro- 
ceedings cannot be good-cause substitutes for the notice and 
comment procedure, and that statutory deadlines alone are in- 
adequate to constitute good cause-a rule of interpretation that 
will effectuate the congressional intention that "the legislative 
functions of administrative agencies shall so far as possible be 
exercised only upon public par t ic ipa t i~n"~~~ is necessary. At the 
same time, agencies must be allowed flexibility to deal with 
problematical situations. With these goals in mind, it is appar- 
ent that the good cause exception is appropriately applicable in 
three sets of circumstances. 
The first and clearest case for application of the exception is 
where the problem sought to be alleviated would be exacerbated 
by the actions of those affected if they became aware of the reg- 
ulation before its implementation. The inquiry in this area 
should be focused on what problem the regulation addresses and 
how public notification of the content of the regulation in ad- 
vance of its promulgation would affect that problem. A determi- 
nation that such notification would worsen'the problem would 
justify application of the good cause exception. 
Cases where the delay caused by the notice and comment 
period would in and of itself result in significant public harm 
constitute the second situation for application of the exception. 
Most cases of rulemaking in areas affecting the public health, 
safety, or welfare involve ongoing problems, and significant addi- 
tional harm will not be caused if the problem is allowed to con- 
106. S. R ~ P .  No. 752, supra note 2, at 14; H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 24. 
107. H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, at 23. 
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tinue for the relatively short period of time required to provide 
for prepromulgation notice and comment. Thus, in order to pre- 
serve the integrity of the notice and comment procedure, the 
good cause exception should be employed in such cases only 
where there is a measurable, demonstrable, and significant im- 
pact on the public health, safety, or welfare, directly caused by 
the delay necessary to provide the opportunity for comment. 
The third situation for appropriate application of the good 
cause exception is where the rulemaking relates only to a minor 
or merely technical ruling over which little or no public concern 
could be expected. This category corresponds to the "unneces- 
sary" aspect of good cause as interpreted by the Senate Judici- 
ary Committee Report,lo8 and should be strictly limited to those 
cases where the detrimental effect on any member of the public 
is so minimal that no protest could reasonably be expected. 
Applying the above criteria, an agency should be able to de- 
termine the propriety of dispensing with prepromulgation notice 
and comment under the good cause exception, and enforcement 
of these criteria by the courts should ensure the rights of the 
public to participate in the administrative rulemaking process. 
To effectively implement the policy that effective exercise of 
delegated legislative power is premised on public participation, 
it is important that deviations from the public proceedings re- 
quirements of informal rulemaking be limited to cases where 
such deviation is manifestly necessary, or where public proceed- 
ings can serve no useful purpose. This Comment has suggested 
that only when (1) public proceedings prior to promulgation of a 
rule would exacerbate the problem sought to be corrected, (2) 
the delay caused by public proceedings would in and of itself 
result in significant public harm, or (3) no public concern could 
reasonably be expected, should notice and comment be dis- 
pensed with under the good cause exception to the notice and 
comment requirement of informal rulemaking. Careful definition 
of the circumstances under which the good cause exception is 
properly employed will promote the continued integrity of the 
notice and comment procedure as a means of assisting agencies 
in developing rules that soundly implement congressional policy 
108. S. REP. NO. 752, supra note 2, at 14; see also H.R. REP. NO. 1980, supra note 2, 
at 24. 
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and as a means of providing those affected by administrative 
powers an opportunity to protect their rights. 
Layne M. Campbell 
